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During the last decade measures of overt and covert surveillance, information sharing and deterrence of
the illegal movement of people has increased within and between states. Border security has come to
dominate international relations, and increasingly to deflect the needs of asylum-seekers who search for a
state that will offer them substantive protection under the Refugee Convention. Measures of internal and
external deterrence diminish the reality of protection to genuine refugees as some of the most vulnerable
individuals in the world today. Australia, as a country of relative geographic isolation, has not
experienced the large-scale influxes of asylum-seekers seen in many parts of the world. Notwithstanding
this, the Australian Government has in recent years implemented harsh policy and administrative
measures directed at asylum-seekers with a substantial measure of public support. In August 2001, an
incident involving 433 asylum-seekers was branded in popular discourse an ‘asylum crisis’. This incident
involved a Norwegian freighter, the Tampa, which picked up survivors from a sinking boat who were
making their way to Australian waters in order seek protection under the Refugee Convention. The
Tampa was repelled by Australian security forces from disembarking the people they had picked up in
distress on Australian soil. In this article, I explore the Tampa incident against the backdrop of refugee
policy development from 1999. I argue that rather than responding to a crisis, the Australian government
has generated the perception of a crisis in the Australian community. Implications of the Australian
response to asylum-seekers are significant not only in the Asia/Pacific region, but further afield, as policy
responses toward asylum-seekers by receiving states have converged in the recent past.
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Introduction: the contemporary politics of asylum
The year 2001 marked the 50th anniversary of the United Nations Refugee Convention
(hereafter the Refugee Convention), which most directly articulates the grounds of
protection that should be offered to those fleeing persecution. The majority of countries
in the world do have substantive obligations to people who claim to be refugees, as
signatories to the Refugee Convention and its Protocol of 1967. In the fifty-year period
since the establishment of the Refugee Convention, the idea of (some) rights being
universal, thereby applicable to all of humanity rather than the members of a particular
state, has been given political efficacy through the vehicle of human rights. Rights, such
as those embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, privilege no
particular concept of human life, of cultural traits, beliefs or practices. We see that the
consolidation of human rights has gathered momentum in the later half of the twentieth
century through the proliferation of human rights institutions and the efficacy of the
idea that protecting such rights is of intrinsic value across and between cultures and
nations. The central pillars of human rights, including the Refugee Convention, continue
to be important instruments for ensuring the protection of people in vulnerable, life
threatening circumstances. Yet at the same time, the persecution of individuals and
groups has continued in various waves of violence in locations around the world, testing
the practical efficacy of the universal norms embodied in human rights law. The
grounds for persecution of particular individuals or groups continue to relate to those
characteristics which differentiate people; such as race, religion, nationality, gender and
particular political affiliations. Yet we expect these very distinctions to be irrelevant, or
at least suspended, when obligations to substantive human rights are tested such as by
the arrival of asylum-seekers asking for protection under the Refugee Convention in a
signatory state.
Notwithstanding the penetration of human rights as valued principles during the late
twentieth century, geopolitical shifts in the balance of political order from the early
1990s have resulted in an increase in localized conflicts, leading to humanitarian crises
in many parts of the world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union ruptured the Cold War
stand-off which had maintained a modicum of international stability with the political
polarization of the world around the camps of two superpowers, the Soviet Union and
the United States of America. The effects of decolonization in Africa and Asia also
continued to be felt into the 1990s with regional and local conflict in the African
continent and in many parts of Asia. Most recently the ‘war on terror’ in the aftermath
of the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in
Washington on 11 September 2001, has contributed to forced migration and the spectre
of an enlarged Middle East conflict should the United States led invasion of Iraq
eventuate.
Paradoxically, it is the countries which themselves safeguard democratic principles,
uphold the rule of law, and are the most vocal defenders of human rights around the
globe which have felt the need to increase mechanisms of immigration control over the
last decade. Western democracies which have in the past benefited from immigration,
whether through guest worker programmes, or other planned immigration intakes, are
increasingly concerned to guard their borders from the movement of people including
those claiming protection under the Refugee Convention, through various forms of
internal and external deterrence. The movement of ‘unauthorized arrivals’ – those
without a visa or other travel permit – has as a result become increasingly clandestine,
with people smugglers profiting from the trade in human cargo. The most recent2
statistics available from the UNHCR point to a decline in asylum applications in most
parts of the world (UNHCR 2002). In the second quarter of 2002, for instance, in the 20
European countries surveyed, applications fell by eight per cent. Of course such a
decline can be an indication of the cessation of conflict and other refugee producing
phenomena. However, at a time in history when we know that ‘push factors’ which
generate forced migration are not in decline, the drop in asylum applications,
particularly in Western countries, indicates tougher border enforcement and other
administrative techniques to deter asylum arrivals. The same trend is evident in
Australia, as I will outline later.
The 1951 Refugee Convention promises non-refoulement; that those with genuine fears
of persecution will not be returned to the source of their persecution. With this promise,
receiver societies also bear the consequence (burden), of providing for the needs of such
new arrivals. It would follow that addressing the ‘root causes’ of flight would be in the
long-term interest of receiver societies, ensuring that the numbers of unanticipated
arrivals claiming protection are reduced. However, through the 1990s we have seen
efforts on the part of Western states directed at deterring such ‘irregular’ arrivals and
measures aimed at their removal, rather than initiatives seeking the resolution of refugee
causing conflict and violence. Monetary aid to economically developing countries has
been in decline in many countries of the West, and what development assistance is
given is often in the form of ‘tied aid’, focusing on particular projects with an economic
or other benefit to the donor country. Certainly diplomatic, development and democratic
institution building efforts in, and with refugee generating states continue to take place.
Measures aimed at deterring the arrival of asylum-seekers though, have become a
priority for states of the West, with an infusion of significant resources to fund internal
and external measures to detect, detain, deport and in other ways discourage ‘irregular’
or ‘illegal’ arrivals, or ‘aliens’, including those with protection claims.
Before elaborating on the case of the Australian responses to asylum migration since
1999, I shall briefly outline a case for the obligation to protect; an argument which
begins with the assumption that borders must be porous enough for individuals to be
able to claim protection in the first place.
Normative reasoning and the obligation to protect
The response to those who have fled their homes and seek protection elsewhere requires
careful and detailed differentiation, highlighting the needs and the rights of the resident
as well as the newcomer. It is this tension between the ‘needs of strangers’ and the
needs of citizens which both state and non-state actors reflect in their arguments for
admission or expulsion (rejection) of asylum-seekers. Michael Ignatieff (1984) reminds
us that understanding human needs and their fulfilment is a process open to
politicization and manipulation, as it is a process based upon a presumption that
someone knows the needs of another, or indeed that we truly understand our own needs.
Ignatieff asks: ‘when is it right to speak for the needs of strangers? Politics is not only
the art of representing the needs of strangers; it is also the perilous business of speaking
on behalf of needs which strangers have had no chance to articulate on their own’ (ibid.:
12).
The obligations that hold specifically for those seeking protection require a state to
properly consider a protection application, ensuring that an impartial arbiter assess
every claim for protection on its merits. A state which has acceded to international3
human rights conventions, has ‘special’ obligations towards an individual who may be a
refugee, no matter her or his mode of entry. Such ‘special’ obligations pertain to the
protection which a refugee requires while the origin of her or his persecution continues
and moreover, are obligations which do not extend to immigrants generally.
In practice, the application and validity of the Refugee Convention has been
increasingly challenged as the movement of refugees has increased in scale and
complexity in the post-Cold War era (Hathaway 1997). The provisions of international
law, including the Refugee Convention as well as the UN Convention on Human
Rights, indicate a contradiction in that the right to leave is provided with no
complementary right to admission anywhere else. This contradiction has, particularly
since the mid-1980s when refugee numbers began to grow significantly, resulted in the
prevalence of ‘statelessness’ and the phenomenon of ‘refugees in orbit’ as states have
increased administrative measures aimed at deterring all irregular arrivals.
While according to international law, embodied in the Refugee Convention, a person is
a refugee at the point at which she or he meets the definition of refugee, the problem
many individuals face in seeking the protection of a state other than their own, is living
through the period that lapses between the events which transformed a person into a
refugee, and substantive protection which affirms refugee status, thereby granting such
things as residency rights, the right to work, to education, to language training and to
health care. To be sure, it is true that when a person arrives in a state ‘illegally’ or
without prior authorization, the process of formal legal recognition can be hazardous,
lengthy as well as costly. This in no way diminishes the obligation to protection of the
receiving state however. If this obligation is indeed taken seriously, it is not dispensed
until such time as an individual is found not to be a refugee, rather than the reverse,
where a person is assumed as non genuine for a variety of contingent reasons, prior to a
proper assessment of a protection claim, including mode of arrival.
There are perhaps two major factors within receiver states which limit the commitment
to substantive refugee protection. The first is what I term the ‘overload’ factor in
relation to public perceptions regarding numbers of immigrants, perceptions in which
refugees and asylum-seekers are most often included as a general category of newcomer
or foreigner. That is, politicians and decision makers may perceive that the public
perception of immigration numbers are exceeding local tolerance, with the possibility of
a voter backlash. Second, and often resulting from the first factor, a link may
subsequently be made between refugee protection and the national resources required to
achieve such ends.
Before exploring the most recent developments in Australia’s response to asylum-
seekers, and in particular, ‘boat people’ who arrive without authorization such as a valid
visa, I will outline some historical features of Australia’s refugee system.
A brief history of refugee migration to Australia
Newcomers are not a rarity in Australia, rather the norm. Australia has a highly refined
set of administrative filtering and management measures, tuned to differentiate between
categories of newcomers. Though Australia received refugees from various conflicts in
Europe during the nineteenth century, it was not until 1945 that a specific refugee policy
was adopted (Castles 1996: 259) and the first Minister of Immigration, Arthur Caldwell
was nominated. Since then, the emphasis in Australia has been placed particularly on4
administrative control over the processes by which people are selected for migration to
Australia, and on the entitlements and services they receive upon arrival. Previously, the
focus of immigration policy had been on helping British immigrants and discouraging
‘alien Europeans’, resulting in at least a partial exclusion of non European immigrants
(Freeman and Jupp 1992: 131). After 1945, economic expansion was accompanied by
similarly rapid population growth. The slogan, ‘populate or perish’, embodied the
arguments utilized to win over a sceptical Australian citizenry to the view that selective
immigration would benefit the country, particularly in the economic sphere. A large-
scale immigration programme was accompanied by a policy of assimilation, considered
necessary to the maintenance of homogeneity, as well as responding to popular local
fears (Castles 1996). From the early 1970s, multicultural policies emerged, premised on
the view that cultural differences ought to be able to coexist in a society, while the
political integration of newcomers would foster peace and stability.
Today, Australia continues to operate its immigration policy under a yearly quota
system, whereby the government sets a numerical target for the various categories of
immigrants who are to be considered for entry in the following year. Apart from
separate quotas for skilled workers, business migration, and a family reunion quota,
yearly quotas have, over the past decade, consistently set aside around 12,000 places for
the humanitarian intake, which comprises various categories of refugees, or people in
refugee-like situations.1 The humanitarian programme has remained largely quarantined
from controversy and had bi-partisan support. Asylum-seeker arrivals have been tied to
the yearly immigration and humanitarian quota since 1996/7, shortly after the
Conservative Howard Government came to power, setting an artificial cap for the
number of asylum-seekers able to be accommodated in the programme in any given
year.2 The number of such ‘unauthorized arrivals’ is thereby pegged to the humanitarian
programme (people selected off-shore), with the result that when the number of asylum-
seekers successful in their applications exceed the quota set aside, the corresponding
numbers are taken off humanitarian places offered for that year.3
It has been the response to boat people and unauthorized air arrivals since 1989, which
has generated some considerable disquiet (though largely outside Australia) regarding
Australia’s standards of refugee protection under international obligations. Though the
present day approach to boat arrivals and other asylum-seekers can be traced to this
earlier period, there are also significant points of departure in the policy and treatment
of asylum-seekers since August 2001. I turn now to an analysis of the asylum debate in
Australia in the period leading up to the Tampa crisis of August 2001. I focus in
particular on the administrative and policy developments in ‘managing’ asylum-seekers
which have generated the highest level of public disquiet and political intervention by
                                                
1 The Humanitarian Programme consists of three main categories: Refugee, Special Humanitarian and
Special Assistance. In addition, in 1989, a new category; Women at Risk, was added to the refugee
component for women who were deemed to be in particularly vulnerable situations. Between July
1989 and June 1997, 2,222 Women at Risk visas were issued (1997: 14). The establishment of the
Women at Risk category came after considered and lengthy advocacy by Australian NGOs.
2 This numerical link, while officially not having an absolute ceiling, is nevertheless at least a potential
psychological barrier to processing officers, aware that a certain absorption level has been preset.
3 The Australian Government has not given any clear indications how it would proceed should the
number of spontaneous arrivals exceed the total humanitarian quota.5
the Australian Government: detention, the human consequences for those detained, and
the introduction of a temporary protection visa (TPV). My aim is to show the way in
which the management and treatment of asylum-seekers from 1999 on, together with
the way the issue was portrayed and debated in the public sphere, generated the
conditions which enabled the Tampa incident and the political developments which
followed, to occur with overwhelming public support.
Detention: a uniquely Australian approach
In the lead up to the Tampa crisis, perhaps the most divisive issue regarding asylum-
seekers in Australia has been the policy of mandatory and non-reviewable detention of
people who arrive without documentation. Cambodian boat people arrived in Australia
from 1989 to 1992, fleeing the Pol Pot dictatorship, were the first group of unauthorized
arrivals subject to detention in Australia. The response to boat arrivals from November
1989, marks a toughening in the approach to boat arrivals and other ‘illegal’ arrivals to
Australia. The most recent significant ‘wave’ of boat arrivals began in 1999. All but the
first wave of boat arrivals, during the 1970s, have been subject to mandatory and non-
reviewable detention. Though the numbers of boat arrivals in Australia were not
significant until 1999, as indicated in the Table, the public perception of inundation, or
flooding, has fostered antipathy toward asylum-seekers. This perception of inundation
and being unfairly overburdened, has been fostered by successive governments, both
Labor and Liberal, failing to communicate the dissonance between perception and
reality. No doubt, the mass media has also played a significant role in generating public
unease over asylum-seekers; communicating about the issue of asylum arrivals with a
vigour and urgency out of step with the impact of asylum-seekers on Australian society.
The bi-partisan support of mandatory detention continues to have a significant bearing
on the public acceptance of this policy. Through the 1990s, the practice of mandatory
and non-reviewable detention of boat arrivals continued. During this period, detention
centres in the large urban centres of Sydney and Melbourne increasingly housed air
arrivals who were not in possession of travel documents and had been able to engage
Australia’s protection obligations. Those who arrive at Australia’s sea or airports and
seek asylum are not automatically given information about the Australian determination
process. In detention centres, new arrivals are initially kept apart (incommunicado) from
other detainees as part of a pre-screening process. During this period, which can extend
to several weeks, access to a lawyer is not guaranteed.
The Australian Government maintains that the detention regime is necessary for the
maintenance of immigration control: that is, to ‘uphold the universal visa requirement
and to guard against unauthorized arrivals undermining the immigration program’
(Mediansky 1998: 126). However, there has also been an acknowledgement by the
Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), as well as
by individual politicians, that the practice of mandatory detention, is used as a
deterrence to others who may arrive in this manner. This approach is contrary to the
UNHCR recommendations on the justified application of detention on asylum-seekers.4
                                                
4 The UNHCR guidelines on the detention of asylum-seekers begin by stating that detention is
inherently undesirable, particularly in the case of vulnerable groups, such as single women and
children, unaccompanied minors and those with special medical of psychological needs. The
guidelines assert that as a general principle the detention of asylum-seekers should only be entered6
Non-citizens in Australia without authorization
Year Plane arrivals Boat arrivals Over-stayers
2000/01 1,508 4,141 53,000
1999/00 1,695 4,175 53,000
1998/99 2,106 920 53,143
1997/98 1,550 157 51,000
1996/97 1,350 365 45,100
1995/96 663 589 –
1994/95 485 1,071 –
1993/94 – 194 –




Total 11,805 13,489 n/a
Source:DIMIA Factsheet 74.
Note: * Total arrivals by air: 1989-93.
In 1997 the Howard Government opened the running of Australia’s immigration
detention centres to public tendering. The tender was won by Australasian Correctional
Management (ACM), a subsidiary of the American Wackenhut Corporation, better
known for developing privately run prisons in the US (MacCallum 2002: 28). As well
as being responsible for security within detention centres, ACM is responsible for the
delivery of social services, such as the accommodation, education, recreational,
catering, health care, welfare and counselling to detainees as well as the infrastructure
maintenance of the centres. Officers of DIMIA monitor the performance of ACM and
the government retains ultimate responsibility for detention.5 One of the problems that
has come to light from the privatization of detention management, is the ability of the
government to withhold information from the public on the grounds of commercial
confidentiality agreements (Crock and Saul 2002: 82). The result of this policy is
limited public scrutiny of detention practices and accountability procedures of the
treatment of detainees. While access to the detention facilities in the urban centres of
Sydney, Melbourne and Perth is possible, though limited, for journalists and members
of the public, while access to the remote centres of South Australia and Western
Australia is generally closed to the public, with journalists only being admitted on
formal tours.
                                                                                                                                              
into in exceptional circumstances. The guidelines invoke Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, which
asks contracting states not to apply restrictions to the movement of refugees and not to punish them on
account of illegal entry.
5 As set out in the Immigration Detention Standards which are part of the contractual agreement with
ACM.7
The attention given to the detention issue by the Australian media has oscillated from
periods of near silence, to periods of daily scrutiny across media outlets. The detention
of Cambodians in the early 1990s, received consistent media attention for a limited
period, which became part of the pressure resulting in the Senate inquiries of 1992 and
1994 (Kingston 1993: 8-14). The period from 1999 however, has been characterized by
renewed and heightened media focus on the detention of asylum-seekers. Some of this
is due to the increase in numbers of boat arrivals. But this alone is insufficient to explain
the renewed interest in the detention issue, which had largely been an issue of relatively
minor public and political interest. During 1999 new detention facilities were opened at
the disused rocket base at Woomera and at the Curtin air base in the remote Kimberley
town of Derby,6 as the existing detention centres could not accommodate the boat
arrivals during that year.
The Table indicates that though the number of boat arrivals did increase quite
dramatically in 1999 and 2000 compared to earlier periods, the number of unauthorized
or ‘illegal’ arrivals seeking to invoke Australia’s protection obligations remained small
considering the number of annual asylum applicants to arrive in the member states of
the EU, to Canada and to the US.
Stories of riots and protests within detention centres and actions of self harm, including
hunger strikes, the sewing-together of lips and suicide attempts, became almost daily
news items through 2000 and 2001. Television footage during August 2000, depicted
ACM staff, assisted by police from South Australia in full riot gear, with helmets,
batons and shields, quelling a protest consisting of around eighty detainees at the
Woomera detention centre. Ultimately water cannon was used to quell the riot (Mares
2001: 35). Other accounts began to filter from detention centres of ACM officers using
excessive force and in some cases beating detainees. Video footage from the Villawood
detention centre showed detainees being assaulted and subsequently denied medical
attention for their injuries (Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 2001: 3).
In June 2001 The Australian Catholic Social Justice Council (ACSJC) characterized the
treatment in detention centres as torture:
At certain stages in their processing, asylum-seekers in detention are not
allowed contact with their families ... Unlike those convicted of a
criminal offence, asylum-seekers do not know for how long they will be
detained. In some immigration detention centres observations and
musters involve waking asylum-seekers at night or shining torches on
them while they are sleeping (Australian Associated Press 26 June 2001).
During the same period the World Council of Churches (WCC) indicated it was ‘deeply
troubled’ about Australia’s detention practices, particularly in light of the small numbers
of unauthorized arrivals coming to Australia compared to other regions of the world
(Reuters 6 July 2001). Despite considerable public criticism of the mandatory detention
system by human rights groups in Australia and internationally, the policy has retained
the support of the majority of Australians. A survey on Channel 9’s Sunday
                                                
6 Plans are now underway for a permanent immigration detention facility to be built in Darwin and on
Christmas Island.8
programme,7 for instance indicated 78 per cent of Australians did not think asylum-
seekers were harshly dealt with (1 July 2001).
Re-traumatizing refugees
As by now well documented side-effect of Australia’s detention policy is the
psychological trauma detention causes: a phenomenon which is exacerbated when
detention is prolonged, and for an indefinite period. Research conducted on the impact
of detention on asylum-seekers indicates that detention has the potential to re-traumatise
people from a refugee background, many of whom experienced torture and trauma in
their country of origin (Silove et al. 1993; Silove and Steel 1998). In these cases
detention, particularly where its duration is not defined, leaves individuals susceptible to
re-traumatizations. Torture and trauma counselling services have been reluctant to
provide services to asylum-seekers in detention due to the retraumatizing experience as
a result of being detained for indefinite periods.
A growing concern among human rights groups in Australia, especially in relation to the
‘on-shore’ arrivals, is the impact of government policy on the general well-being and
mental health of detainees. Even for those living in the community, extreme anxiety is
linked to delays in processing applications, poverty resulting from lack of entitlements
such as work permits, racial discrimination and conflict with immigration officials, fears
of being sent home and separation from family (Silove and Steel 1998: 10-11).8
The most recent experiences of the self harm of asylum-seekers in detention, and the
continuing concern over the physical and psychological development of children in
detention, has refocused health professionals on their particular responsibility in relation
to these individuals (Silove et al. 2000: 608-9). By August 2001, the Australian Medical
Association (AMA) had become involved in the detention issue, with the Federal
President, Dr Karen Phelps, speaking out against the health effects of detention (ABC
Radio National, 13 August 2001). It must be borne in mind that though many members
of the medical profession involved with detainees have had significant concerns about
the health of detainees in the past, are sworn to a confidentiality agreement by DIMIA.
The rationale for detention
The Australian state regularly and unapologetically utilizes the idea of deterrence as
justification for the continued practice of mandatory and non-reviewable detention of
asylum-seekers in Australia. Since the early 1990s this has been a bipartisan approach
of the two major political parties in Australia, the Liberal/National coalition and the
Labor Party.
                                                
7 A weekly current affairs programme which reviews the week’s social and political developments.
8 The report surveyed a group of Tamil asylum-seekers in detention at the Maribyrnong Detention
Centre in Melbourne. Seventy two per cent of these detainees reported having been tortured in their
country of origin. The report poses the question of whether detention worsens the psychological
symptoms of traumatized asylum-seekers. On six measures, including; depression, suicidal ideation,
post traumatic stress symptoms, anxiety, panic attack symptoms and physical symptoms, detainees
were two to three times more likely to experience such adverse effects of detention compared to
asylum-seekers and resettlement refugees living in the community (Silove and Steel 1998: 30).9
Detention is a policy decision and a strategic and administrative practice which is
unambiguously about containment, separation and punishment, the latter being
consistently denied in the case of the treatment of asylum-seekers. Practised on
individuals deemed ‘anti-social’, or as having breached a social code or law, detention
reaffirms the security of the rest. Moreover, the association between detention and
punishment, even in the case of asylum-seekers, is not an arbitrary nor ambiguous
association (Caloz-Tschopp 1997: 166). While the nexus between security and
punishment is often hidden in official accounts of detention practice and the rationale
for such practices by governments, it becomes more visible through the testimony of
those detained, requiring independent scrutiny of the media and non-state actors.
Most Western states have implemented a raft of deterrence measures over the last
decade, with the aim of keeping at bay those who may seek to invoke protection
obligations. Such measures include, carrier sanctions, special visa requirements on
nationals from refugee producing states, the placement of additional immigration
officers at overseas ports, ‘burden shifting’ arrangements with other states, and the
interdiction of refugees at frontiers as well as in international waters, ensuring they
cannot enter Western states and claim protection (Hathaway 1997). The Australian
state, however, remains unique among Western countries, in the vigour with which it
utilizes detention as a deterrence measure. Australia has also struck a regional
agreement with Indonesia, overseen by the IOM, whereby Indonesian authorities, often
police, intercept and detain ‘irregular’ migrants bound for Australia. The Australian
Government shares the cost of caring for the detainees in Indonesia with the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) until such time as they can be
voluntarily repatriated, or resettled in a safe country. The majority of people detained in
Indonesia who have been intercepted on their way to Australia are Afghani and Iraqi.
As undocumented arrivals are not felons, the detention of these individuals beyond a
reasonable time for health and security checks, has some significant tensions for a
democracy. The willingness to detain asylum-seekers for long periods is symptomatic of
a defensive political system. However, the use of moral arguments premised on human
rights principles to encourage alternative detention policies, have largely been dismissed
by the Australian Government and in public discourse, at least until the asylum-seeker
issue reached a critical mass of public interest through June and July of 2001. At this
time the Australian media began to take a sustained interest in the issue of detention,
especially over the treatment of children in detention.
As I have already noted, the issue of boat people has received a level of media attention
out of keeping with the numbers of such arrivals and the impact they have on Australian
society. This trend has escalated in recent years as the application of detention policy on
such ‘illegal’ arrivals has become increasingly harsh. Unlike earlier periods, the media
coverage of the detention issue from 1999, regularly highlighted the human suffering of
detention.
Creating ‘second-class’ asylum-seekers with the Temporary Protection Visa
One of the most significant changes in recent years to the status of individuals found to
be genuine refugees, is the introduction in October 1999, of a Temporary Protection
Visa (TPV, Visa Subclass 785). This change focuses on the documentary validity of
entry to Australia as the determinant of the visa an individual may be granted once she
or he has been found to be a refugee. The TPV grants a three-year temporary status,10
during which time no family reunion or access to other significant resettlement
programmes is available. A TPV means an individual has no automatic right of return
upon leaving Australia and no eligibility for Medicare.9 On the other hand, those
persons who arrive in Australia with valid travel documents and subsequently apply for
refugee status, face an often arduous task in proving the legitimacy of their claims. That
is, the bona fides of asylum-seekers living in the community as individuals who have
escaped some form of persecution are called into question even before the particulars of
their situation can be investigated, as they were in a safe enough position to avail
themselves of travel documents from their government authorities and be able to
purchase an air ticket to Australia.10
Two new categories of TPV were introduced to Australian law as a result of a raft of
legislative changes under the Migration Amendment Bill 2001, which followed closely
after the Tampa incident of August 2001, and only weeks before the federal election of
November 2001. I will discuss the ‘Tampa incident’ and the ensuing Migration
Amendment Bill shortly. But first, the earlier introduction of the TPV in 1999, met with
stiff opposition from NGO advocates, many of whom interpreted this measure as an
erosion of Australia’s commitment to its protection obligations and another indication
of the development of a ‘two-class’ refugee system, where asylum-seekers are
stigmatized as ‘queue jumpers’, fraudulent and criminal by elements of the media and
by prominent politicians. The RCOA, in a position paper on the TPV, argues that this
new visa class is being used as a form of punishment for those who have circumvented
Australian immigration control by their unauthorized entry and to act as a deterrent to
future arrivals. It lists the preclusion of family reunion as perhaps the most harmful
limitation on TPV holders. In addition, the RCOA argues that Australia is acting in a
manner contrary to its obligations under the Refugee Convention, which provides that
contracting states shall ‘not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry’ (Article
31), (RCOA, Position on Temporary Protection Visas, November 1999).
The policy and practice of mandatory detention has been contested in a relatively
narrow public debate, at least until the period leading up to the Tampa crisis, of August
2001. As I will detail later, the Tampa crisis was in essence a relatively minor incident,
involving the presence in Australian waters of a boatload of some 460 asylum-seekers.
However this boatload of asylum-seekers and the Norwegian freighter, Tampa which
sought to rescue them at sea, became a lightning rod for major changes to Australian
migration law and to the processing of asylum claims. This one incident also solidified
public opinion firmly against asylum-seekers. There was nothing singular or
conspicuous about the Tampa boatload of asylum-seekers. Rather, the political and
subsequently legislative responses of the Australian Government to this particular
boatload of asylum-seekers has become the caesura in the Australian public sphere and
in the politics of asylum (MacCallum 2002; Rundle 2001). Coming as it did only a few
weeks before the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, the
                                                
9 More recent amendments to the TPV stopped any access to permanent residency status.
10 If successful in their claim, however, such entrants are granted permanent residency through a Visa
Subclass 866, and have access to full social security benefits, to work permission and to 510 hours of
English language training.11
Tampa crisis marks a departure from more measured and considered policy
development in earlier periods of Australian political life.11
The detail of developments in the Australian handling of asylum claims, particularly
since 1999, allow us to now consider the developments in the politics of asylum around
the Tampa issue. Perhaps the developments leading up to Tampa allow some
explanation of the inflammatory nature of this incident and the subsequent
ramifications.
Generating fear from one boatload of asylum-seekers: Tampa and beyond
Events in late August 2001, have witnessed the most dramatic escalation of the ‘politics
of asylum’, and the ensuing treatment which those who seek protection in Australia
face. On 18 August, the Sydney Morning Herald carried a headline; ‘PM calls for
tighter law on asylum seekers’. The article begins: ‘The Prime Minister yesterday
declared war on illegal immigrants, saying Australia must ‘redouble our efforts’ to
make it less attractive for them to come here’. On 26 August, a small boat, carrying 433
asylum-seekers which had embarked from Indonesia, was in distress and appeared to be
on the verge of sinking some 140 km north of Christmas Island, which is part of
Australian territory. A Norwegian commercial container ship, the MV Tampa, rescued
the asylum-seekers and, after initially seeking to return them to Indonesia, attempted to
take them to Christmas Island.
The captain of the Tampa, Arne Rinnan, was refused access to Australian waters and
threatened with fines and the impounding of his ship. A stand-off ensued with the
Indonesian, Norwegian and Australian Governments negotiating on the question of
responsibility for the asylum-seekers, while the asylum-seekers themselves were falling
ill as a result of their journey and the conditions on the deck of the Tampa where they
were being temporarily housed. The Australian Prime Minister, was interviewed by the
national broadcaster, the ABC, on the evening of 27 August 2001. In response to a
series of questions on Australia’s response to the Tampa issue he stated:
We are a decent, compassionate, humanitarian country, but we also have
an absolute right to decide who comes to this country ... It is an appalling
human tragedy that people wander the world in search of a home. I
understand that, but no country can surrender the right to decide who
comes here and how they come here. We have an open, non-
discriminatory immigration policy and obviously there are people who
seek to exploit the generosity of Australia and what we are trying to do,
as we have done at all points is (sic)strike a balance between our decency
and our generosity, but also making certain that if people come here on
the basis of being refugees they are compared with all other people who
                                                
11 The nexus between illegal boat arrivals and security has been a recurring theme utilized in a bi-
partisan fashion to support detention policy, and most recently utilized by the Howard Government to
gain popular support for the actions and legislative changes surrounding the Tampa crisis. Yet,
notably in late august 2002, ASIO, the Australian Security and Intelligence Service, announced that of
the 6,000 asylum-seekers to have arrived in Australia in the last three years, none has been found to
have posed any security risk to Australia (ABC Lateline, 22 August 2001).12
are seeking to come here on the basis of being refugees (ABC 7.30
Report, 27 August 2001).
Captain Rinnan broke the deadlock, insisting that the safety of his passengers should be
prioritized. As the Tampa made for Christmas Island, Australian Special Air Services
(SAS) troops were ordered to board the ship and take over control. Eventually, after
multilateral negotiation, including the involvement of the UNHCR, the Australian
Government came up with what became known as the ‘Pacific solution’. Prime Minister
Howard insisted that the Tampa asylum-seekers would not be allowed to lodge
protection applications in Australia. After hasty negotiations with neighbouring Pacific
Island nations, the Tampa asylum-seekers, and all subsequent boat arrivals who have
been intercepted by the Australian Navy, have been sent on to processing centres in the
neighbouring Pacific states of Naru and Manus Island of Papua New Guinea. The
Tampa incident is estimated to have cost the Australian government US$120 million,
and the ‘Pacific solution’ is still proving to be a drain on Australia’s financial resources,
as Australia covers the cost of detention as well as ‘friendship’ payments to the nations
which are hosting the asylum-seekers who were ‘pushed off’ Australian territory and
processed in these neighbouring Pacific states.
By mid September, the Government had placed before the Australian Parliament a raft
of legislative measures; passed with minor amendments before the federal election of 10
November 2001. The Migration Amendment Bill 2001, facilitates stricter border control
and further restricts the rights of asylum-seekers. The effect of the bill is to excise from
the Australian Migration Zone the following of Australia’s territory: Christmas Island,
Ashmore Reef, Cartier Reef and Cocos Island. The consequence is that boat arrivals
landing their craft on these islands will not be considered in Australian territory for the
purpose of lodging a protection application. Further, the Border Protection Bill 2001,
authorizes the removal of any vessel from Australian territorial water if it is deemed that
the intention of the people aboard is to enter Australia unlawfully. Indeed, section 7A of
the Act confirms the power of the government and its administration to act outside of
any legislative authority (Crock and Saul 2002: 39). As part of this package of
amendments, the Judicial Review Bill, which was first introduced to the Senate in
December 1998 was passed. This mechanism restricts access to Federal and High Court
judicial review of administrative decisions under the Migration Act 1958, such as the
decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal.12
Over a year has now passed since the Tampa crisis, and the effects of the political
reaction to this one boatload of asylum-seekers remain prominent in the Australian
public sphere. The diplomatic stand-off which ensued and the raft of legislative changes
which were passed through the Australian Parliament as a direct result of the Tampa
crisis, are indeed disproportionate to the dilemma which 433 asylum-seekers wishing to
seek protection in Australia could be expected to generate. However, the Tampa crisis,
coming as it did just two weeks before the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Centre
in New York, and the Pentagon in Washington, has consolidated public opinion in
Australia firmly in support of the Government actions. Public opinion polls reflected a
                                                
12 This mechanism is known as a privative clause. On 4 February 2003, the High Court of Australia
upheld the Tampa laws while affirming the ‘right of any person from appealing against a decision of a
public servant when they had made a “jurisdictional error” – for example, and error of law of bias’
(Tampa law loses its punch after ruling, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 February 2003).13
ten-point surge in support of the Government in the weeks leading up to the federal
election of 10 November 2001, at the time that the Pacific solution was being carried
out (The Australian, 11-12 May 2002: 24-5).13 A vocal minority within Australia rejects
the Government’s approach to asylum-seekers; the long-term detention of those who
arrived before Tampa and the warehousing of the Tampa asylum-seekers as part of the
‘Pacific solution’, while the majority of Australians support the Government’s actions.
National security and the maintenance of a control system of immigration – symbolized
by an immigration queue – are the threads which bind the Howard Government’s
administrative and legislative direction to public opinion.
I will briefly recount some points leading to the sea rescue of the Tampa becoming an
international incident and the subsequent action taken by the Australian Government.
As I have outlined earlier, public reaction to the detention of asylum-seekers, and in
particular the treatment of children in detention had gathered significant momentum
through 2000 and early 2001, indicating the beginning of a swing away from support for
Government policy.
Night after night, an ashen Philip Ruddock, the Immigration Minister, had been
appearing on television in these weeks leading up to the Tampa incident, to explain
mass breakouts, suicides, nervous breakdowns, the presence of a catatonic boy and mass
hunger strikes at the country’s detention centres, including Villawood and Curtin.
Howard was calling on the Senate to pass legislation to limit even further the access of
asylum-seekers to the courts. The annual boat season was under way and to prepare for
their arrival, Ruddock had announced new detention centres at HMAS Coonawara in
Darwin, the army camp at Singleton in NSW and at the El Alamein camp near Port
Augusta in South Australia. Christmas Island was bursting: there would be 1,000
asylum-seekers there once those on the deck of the Tampa landed.
At some point after 09.40 on the night of 26/27 August someone made the decision that
the Tampa was to be turned back to Indonesia by threatening the master with the full
weight of the Migration Act. The Tampa was not to be thanked for rescuing the human
cargo on the Palapa 1 but accused of facilitating their illegal voyage. Australia was
taking the view that the Tampa was not on a search and rescue mission but conducting a
people smuggling operation (Sydney Morning Herald, 20-21 October 2001: 40).
In the weeks following the Tampa crisis, the asylum debate was kept on the front page
of national newspapers and the key item in television and radio broadcasts with another
asylum-seeker incident: the ‘children overboard’ affair. The government claimed that
children had been thrown overboard by their parents from boats making their way to
Australian waters in early September 2001, in an attempt to intimidate the Australian
government:
The Government reported that children wearing lifejackets were thrown
into the sea after the vessel was stopped by HMAS Adelaide off
Christmas Island yesterday.
                                                
13 Captain Arne Rinnan has received 13 awards around the world for his actions in resulting the asylum-
seekers, including an Australian human rights award, The Sailor’s Prize for 2001, Captain of the Year
by the British shipping newspaper and awarded the King of Norway’s Medal of Honour, 1st Class.14
Adults, also in lifejackets, jumped overboard in what Mr Ruddock
described as ‘disturbing ... planned and premeditated’ action with the
‘intention of putting us under duress’.
The incident keeps the border control issue on centre stage, after last
week’s forcible removal of people from HMAS Manoora onto Nauru
(Sydney Morning Herald, 8 October 2001: 1).
The Prime Minister, John Howard, the Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock, and the
Defence Minister, Peter Reith, made much of the children overboard incident,
particularly articulating repeatedly the bad moral character of people who threw their
children into the sea as a form of intimidation. On the influential talkback radio show of
host, Alan Jones, on 7 October, Prime Minister Howard said: ‘Quite frankly, Alan, I
don’t want in this country people who are prepared, if those reports are true, to throw
their own children overboard. And that kind of emotional blackmail is very distressing’
(Radio 2UE). Defence photographs were released, showing figures with life jackets
floating in the ocean, though identifying information was removed from the
photographs:
For weeks the Government has maintained that children were thrown
into the sea near Christmas Island on 7 October in an attempt to
blackmail authorities into bringing them to the Australian mainland.
It has made extensive political capital during the election campaign of
assertions that its tough border protection policy was designed to keep
out people who were so undesirable that they would deliberately put
children at risk (Sydney Morning Herald, 9 November 2001: 1).
And on the morning of the Federal Election, the asylum-seeker issue remained on the
front page of all the country’s major newspapers:
Stories can be too good to be true. The tale of the Iraqi children thrown
into the ocean off Christmas Island a couple of days after John Howard
called the election was one such story. It always seemed too good to be
true. Demonizing boat people was nothing new. Church leaders claim it
had been under way almost since the 1998 election.
The Howard Government has linked them with terrorists, tarred them
with the Taliban brush, christened them ‘illegals’ and denounced them as
abusers of the Australian court system. It was only another detail in this
grim portrait to say they were the sort of people who would put their
children’s lives at risk to blackmail Australia into giving them asylum
(Sydney Morning Herald, 10-11 November 2001: 27).
The Howard Government won the 2001 election with an enlarged majority. A Senate
inquiry into the children overboard incident after the election, took evidence from senior
defence personnel and senior public servants. The inquiry findings indicate that indeed
children were not thrown overboard; that the photographs the government released on
the eve of the election, claiming that asylum-seekers were seeking to blackmail the
government, were instead saving their lives as the vessel they were on was sinking.
Rather than the asylum-seekers behaving reprehensibly in putting their children’s lives15
at risk, the evidence of the Senate inquiry has revealed a trail of obfuscation and at best
a careful ‘management’ of the information at hand at the most senior levels of the
defence force, the public service and of ministerial advisers (Weller 2002).
Though the political handling of the Tampa incident and the resulting ‘push off’ policies
which have been confirmed by legislation passed as part of the Migration Amendment
Bill 2001, are clearly a new development in Australia’s management of asylum-seekers,
the language of border protection, of ‘queue-jumpers’ and ‘illegal aliens’, is not
altogether a new development.14 Rather, in this, as in other approaches to ‘on-shore’
arrivals, a bi-partisan approach is evident in the Australian political system, as I have
outlined earlier. Gerry Hand, the Minister for Immigration in the early 1990s in the
Hawke Labor Government made regular public pronouncements about ‘illegals’ and
‘queue jumpers’, utilizing derogatory labels as part of the legitimization of tougher
legislative and administrative approaches:
In its zeal to protect the ‘integrity’ of our borders, the Federal
Government has constructed one of the tightest and toughest immigration
systems in the world. This system imposes a heavy burden on
unauthorized boat arrivals ... The system is strict and unyielding –
deliberately so, to discourage further illegal boat entries ... In almost
identical language, the Immigration Department’s deputy secretary, Mr
Wayne Gibbons, and the head of the Department’s protection and
international division, Mr Ian Simington, refer to the threat facing
Australian’s northern borders as population movements in Asia gather
momentum.
Implicit in the comments is the fear that any loss of ‘control’ of the
immigration programme will not only lead to administrative chaos, but
will also shake public confidence in immigration itself. This, above all,
appears to be the driving force behind the government’s tough stand on
boat arrivals (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 November 1992).
While a continuity is evident in contemporary government earlier approaches to
asylum-seekers with earlier periods, especially where they arrive without authorization,
the developments that resulted from the Tampa crisis indicate a marked escalation in the
politics of fear and the nexus between immigration and security. Certainly such general
fears are not unique to Australia. The extent to which legislative and administrative
developments in Australia in relation to the protection of asylum-seekers may be
mirrored by other Western countries is doubtful. The Australian Immigration Minister
visited Europe and Africa in August of 2002, admitting that the asylum-seekers who
were; ‘unable to pierce Australia’s tough border protection system would inevitably
look to Europe for alternative sanctuary’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 24-25 August 2002).
                                                
14 From February 2002, evidence of the Senate inquiry into the ‘Children overboard’ affair emerged
which indicated that senior Government officials, including advisors to the Prime Minister, knew a
few days after the official photographs released by the Royal Australian Navy, depicting the incident
were released in September, that they depicted a rescue rather than the result of children being thrown
in the water. On 19 February 2002, the Prime Minister admitted that Peter Reith, the Defence
Minister, told him three days before the election that there were doubts about the photos that were
released of children thrown overboard (Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 2002: 1).16
Conclusion
Concerns over security are by no means new phenomenon in the logic which drives
state responses to those seeking protection. However, heavy-handed responses to
asylum-seekers, or to those who have been ‘ethnically profiled’ as a terrorist risk,
engender a degree of unease alongside the moral conviction of those who argue for a
sanctity of territorial borders to the entry of people, while encouraging deregulation in
global trade and the movement of money. Public opinion toward refugees and asylum-
seekers in various local settings, shifts constantly and must be engaged and re-engaged
with every new incursion on the rights of refugees and those seeking protection in order
to ensure the continued efficacy of international human rights mechanisms and law. The
issues around the entry of asylum-seekers, particularly where they enter a country
without authorization are not straightforward, requiring a balance between needs and
aspirations at the local level and the fulfilment of obligations which are held between
states at the international level. Moreover, responses need to be nuanced and flexible to
changing local and international conditions.
The ‘security state’ remains central in driving the political and social construction of
refugees and in particular of asylum-seekers as ‘irregular’ arrivals. This picture re-
emerges powerfully with the example of the Australian response to asylum-seekers
which I have outlined in this paper. Irregular (illegal) arrivals are perceived as a threat
to the cohesion of the nation, while also providing a focus for resentment, readily
exploited by politicians searching for simplistic ways of communicating about complex
social and political problems to their constituents. For those countries, such as Australia,
who accept a certain number of Refugee Convention status persons for resettlement, the
emergence of a ‘two-class’ system is possible, and indeed has emerged in the last few
years in the Australian case, with the introduction of the Temporary Protection Visa
(TPV). Those arriving spontaneously are more readily cast into a pot of ‘non-authentic’
or ‘fraudulent’ claimants, as ‘queue jumpers’; or, in the security heightened
environment of the last eighteen months, as ‘criminals’ or ‘terrorists’. However, even
those countries who do not set aside resettlement places, such as the majority of EU
member states, have also continued along a path of erecting increasingly harsh obstacles
to those seeking protection.
The issue of people smuggling and the illegal status of arrivals, has caused enormous
tension, particularly as this form of entry is perceived as a security threat, no matter the
voracity of someone’s cause for such entry: the strength of a protection claim is
immediately negated by the illegality of their entry. In addition, refugee entry causes
local anxiety due to the perceived change it causes in the receiver society culturally, and
in terms of the resources needed to administer the claims of such entrants. However,
despite the high levels of public anxiety (largely generated by the state itself through
media networks), the state has not lost control of immigration in the 1990s, and the
categorization of ‘crisis’ with regard to illegal entry in particular is much exaggerated
(Zolberg 1999). Numerous scholars, across various disciplines, remind us of the
continuity between past and present population movements (Bade 2000; Joppke 1998
and Hollifield 2000). Such continuity indicates that though the movement of people
across borders has occurred in different ‘waves’ and for different reasons, some
instigated from the source country, some from the country of destination, nevertheless,
the last decade has not witnessed what could be termed a crisis in the numbers of people
moving, or attempting to move to Western states across borders for temporary or
permanent resettlement. Rather, it has been the response to, and interpretation of17
newcomer arrivals by particular states that amounts to a crisis. This is particularly so in
light of the demographic deficit which many Western states are now experiencing with
only an increase in immigration numbers able to forestall a rapid population decline.
The continuation of a system which extends political, social and economic rights only to
members of a particular territory, is a system which can be maintained only through
increasingly defensive measures, including communicative modes which constantly
reinforce a fear of strangers. As this article has argued through an analysis of the
developments in the Australian case, Western states face a dilemma in relation to how
best to respond to ‘irregular’ immigrants: setting in place legal and administrative
measures to restrict the entry and the duration of stay of such arrivals, while at the same
time being seen to be maintaining a ‘fair’ and open system in relation to obligations at
the national and international level. Certainly, Australia may not prove to be the
yardstick for how Western states respond to those who arrive without authorization and
subsequently seek protection. However, the response of a state such as Australia which
has benefited from earlier waves of immigration and which until recent years, was
regularly invoked as a model of successful multicultural integration of newcomers,
cannot be overlooked. Moreover, the treatment of asylum-seekers cannot easily be
distanced from the treatment from other marginalized and voiceless groups.
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